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Scholars hold that there are forty to fifty distinct human rights.'
History teaches that they should be constitutionally enshrined. In
this modern era when constitution-making is multiplying, drafters
of bills of rights must now determine questions of formulation and
location. How should these forty to fifty distinct human rights be
classified; where in these constitutions should these rights be
recited?
This is no idle academic exercise. The modern bill of rights bears
little resemblance to the original American renditions, either in
their genesis in the Virginia Constitution of 1776 or their promul-
gation in the first ten amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion in 1791. There is universal concurrence that the concept of
human rights evolved during the subsequent two centuries. There
is also universal agreement that America's founding fathers erred
in omitting the guarantee of such rights from the 1787 Philadel-
phia Constitution.
Given the requirement of a constitutional listing of human
* Albert P. Blaustein is Professor of Law, Emeritus, at the Rutgers University School of
Law-Camden, and counsel to the Philadelphia-based firm of Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish and
Kauffman. A.B., 1941, Michigan University; LL.B., 1948, Columbia University School of
Law. As president of the Philadelphia Constitution Foundation, he has been counsel, con-
sultant and sometime drafter of more than twenty national constitutions. The author wishes
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rights, drafters of today must grapple with the problem of where in
constitutions such rights should be included. As a prelude to the
exercise of such judgment, they must first categorize and classify
the human rights to be enumerated and guaranteed.
II. AN EXCURSION INTO HISTORY
While the human rights enumeration is a characteristic of all
modern constitutions, it was expressly excluded from the 1787
Philadelphia Constitution. Significantly, this exclusion was engi-
neered by the father of the United States Constitution, James
Madison. Madison and fellow founding father Alexander Hamilton
explained the exclusion in The Federalist Papers2 which they co-
authored with John Jay, who was later named as the nation's first
Chief Justice. Hamilton explained the exclusion best:
[A] minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applica-
ble to a constitution like that under consideration, which is merely
intended to regulate the general political interests of the nation,
than to a constitution which has the regulation of every species of
personal and private concerns....
I go further and affirm that bills of rights ... are not only unnec-
essary in the proposed Constitution but would even be dangerous.
They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not
granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext
to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall
not be done which there is no power to do? ...
... The truth is . . . that the Constitution is itself A BILL OF
RIGHTS.
3
That conclusion was not easily nor unanimously reached. One of
the other founding fathers who participated in the writing of the
United States Constitution in that long, hot summer of 1787 was
George Mason of Virginia, author of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights in the Virginia Constitution of 1776. As the constitutional
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convention was coming to a close without the acceptance of a Bill
of Rights, he argued for a second convention to be held after the
views of the citizenry on this issue were ascertained. Mason rightly
surmised that the American public wanted such inclusion. When
that proposal met with defeat, he refused to add his name to the
signers of the new constitution.
It was Mason and not Madison and Hamilton who eventually
prevailed-not only as to the United States Constitution but as to
the future of constitutional history. When the electorate in state
after state indicated that their ratification votes were conditioned
upon a pledge to add a bill of rights, James Madison was in the
forefront of those willing to make the pledge. In 1789 it was
Madison who authored the American Bill of Rights, formally
added to the Constitution as its first ten amendments on Decem-
ber 15, 1791.'
Mason's Virginia Declaration was not only the first human rights
document but became the model and precedent for all subsequent
human rights declarations.5 By the time America's founding fa-
thers met in Philadelphia, eight of the thirteen states had com-
posed similar bills of rights for their own constitutions. Even more
important, the Virginia Declaration was the model for the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which in turn
spread the Virginia message throughout Europe.'
In the era following World War II, the Virginia Declaration was
of great significance in the deliberations on the Charter of the
United Nations and the three documents comprising the United
4. Madison had originally announced the intention to incorporate the various rights dec-
larations within the body of the Constitution itself but was later persuaded to formulate
them as constitutional amendments.
Only two national constitutions were promulgated before that date: the Polish Constitu-
tion of May 3, 1791 and the French Constitution of September 3, 1791. While there was no
bill of rights in the Polish charter, the French Constitution incorporated the Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen of August 26, 1789.
5. Clinton Rossiter has termed the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the Massachusetts
Constitution (written mainly by John Adams) as "among the world's most memorable tri-
umphs in applied political theory." C. ROSSITER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 231 (1963).
6. "The French intellectual, Brissot, was soon hailing Timmortelle declaration de l'Etat
de Virginie sur la liberte des cultes,' and his countryman Condorcet asserted that the author
of the Virginia declaration had earned 'the eternal gratitude of mankind."' L. GIDNEY,
L'INFLUENCE DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE SUR BRISSOT, CONDORCET ET MME. ROLAND 42
(1930); J. SCHAPIRO, CoNDoRcEr AND THE RISE OF LIBERALISM 221 (1934) (quoted in I. RUT-
LAND, THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1725 - 1792 276 (R. Rutland ed. 1970)).
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Nations International Bill of Rights: the Universal Declaration of
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.7 These documents in turn have become the human rights
chapters of several modern constitutions.
Senegal in 1963, Mali in 1974, and Mauritania in 1985 provide
good illustrations. The Preamble to the Senegal Constitution, for
example, contains these words: "The people of Senegal solemnly
proclaim their independence and their attachment to fundamental
rights as they are defined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen of 1789 and the Universal Declaration of December
10, 1948." 8
III. TRADITIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FORMULATIONS
A. The Generational Classification
Human rights were not all created equal. They differ in kind as
well as degree. They can and should be classified and categorized
by subject, by type, by priority, by effect. This classification and
categorization should direct their constitutional status.
Popular today is the classification of human rights by "genera-
tion." The human rights proclaimed and protected by the United
States Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the Citizen (and their progeny) have been described as
"civil and political rights" and have been delineated as the first
generation of human rights.
The second generation of human rights, according to the experts,
are the "economic, social and cultural rights." These rights were
the subject matter of European constitutionalism after their inclu-
sion in Germany's Weimar Constitution of 1919, and Hans Kel-
sen's 1920 Austrian Constitution, both of which proclaimed their
"social" (not "socialist") character. These rights were also empha-
sized in the Mexican Constitution of 1917, which is not as well
known to European and American constitutionalists, but which has
7. Of all the draft recommendations submitted to the United Nations for the preparation
of the two International Covenants, the most influential was the Statement of Essential
Human Rights, drafted by a Committee Representing the Principal Cultures of the World,
appointed by the American Law Institute, headquartered in Philadelphia. See Blaustein,
Human Rights in the World's Constitutions, in PROGRESS IN THE SPIRIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
FESTSCHRIFT FUR FELIX ERMACORA 599 (1988).
8. SENEGAL CONST. preamble.
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strongly influenced Latin American constitutions for three-
quarters of a century. Such rights were also proclaimed, with quali-
fications, in the first Soviet Constitution of 1918.
The third generation of human rights, fashionable in United Na-
tions and Third World thinking, encompasses the right to peace,
the right to disarmament, the right to a clean environment, and
the right of development. Karel Vasak, long a leader in the human
rights field, described these as "solidarity" rights.9
Newly-coined, the fourth generation of human rights encom-
passes people's rights or group rights-rights based on status and
ascription. This includes the special rights of indigenous peo-
ples-rights based on race, language and ethnicity, and rights that
flow from membership in a particular tribe or caste.10 This is well
illustrated by Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights which states: "In those States in which ethnic, reli-
gious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such mi-
norities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practice their own religion, or to use their own language.""
It is perhaps better illustrated by the aptly named African
[Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 2 Article 12 of
that document sets the stage: "All peoples shall be equal; they
shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Noth-
ing shall justify the domination of a people by another." This was
in effect augmented and supplemented by the Convention Con-
cerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,
adopted in 1989 by the General Conference of the International
Labor Organization. 3 Better known as Convention 169, its Article
1 declares its applicability to:
9. K. Vasak, A 30-year Struggle, UNESCO COURIER 29 (1977). See also Clark, Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1987). The
most detailed treatment is found in D. VARGAS, LA TERCERA GENERACION DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS Y LA PAZ (1983).
10. See Blaustein, The New Nationalism, 30 AM. J. Comp. L. 377, 377 (1982), reprinted in
129 CONG. REC. S5124 (1983). See also Blaustein, Confederation, Condominium Consocia-
tion, Confiliation, in GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 138 (1982-83).
11. See Blaustein, supra note 7 (discussing the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (1966) (entered into force, March 23, 1976)).
12. African [Banju] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, reprinted in 21 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 58
(1982).
13. 28 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1384 (1989).
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(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural
and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of
the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or
partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or
regulations;
(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indige-
nous on account of their descent from the populations which in-
habited the country or a geographical region to which the country
belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establish-
ment of the present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their
legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cul-
tural and political institutions.
The generational classification system is far from precise. There
is much overlapping. For example, while the distinctions between
the first and second generations of human rights provided the ba-
sis for the duality in the United Nations Covenants on (1) Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, and (2) Civil and Political
Rights, duplication (intentional or otherwise) was inevitable and
certain rights might just as well have been in one document as well
as the other.
Article 1, dealing with self-determination, is identical in both
Covenants. Article 3 of both Covenants stresses "the equal right of
men and women." Education in "human rights and fundamental
freedoms" in Article 13 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights could well be a part of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Provisions of the Civil and Political Rights Cove-
nant on "forced or compulsory labour" in Article 8 and the prohi-
bition against imprisonment for "inability to fulfill a contractual
obligation" in Article 11 could both be considered economic or so-
cial matters. Examples of such duplication are many.
This inconsistency was always present in human rights analysis.
The so-called "first generation" United States Constitution made
provision against laws "impairing the obligation of contracts"' 4 and
set forth that private property should not "be taken for public use,
without just compensation.' 15 Surely Ithese are within the sphere of
economics. The United States Constitution also provided for eco-
nomic social and cultural rights in its authorization to the Con-
gress to pass laws "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
416 [Vol. 25:411
1 RIGHTS" AND BILLS OF RIGHTS
Arts" through copyrights and patents."6 It can also be argued that
the economic right to property is subsumed by the concepts of
freedom and liberty which underlie civil and political rights.1 7
Inconsistency is also found in the first generation French Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man in 1789 and the first French Constitu-
tion of 1791. The seventeenth and final provision of the 1789 Dec-
laration addresses the area of economics by describing property as
a "sacred and inviolable right." The 1791 Constitution goes even
further into what are today more commonly labelled as economic
rights: "There shall be created and organized a general establish-
ment of public relief in order to bring up abandoned children, re-
lieve infirm paupers, and provide work for the able-bodied poor
who may not have been able to obtain it for themselves."1 8
B. Rights and the State
Rights can and must be categorized in terms of their relationship
to the state. Such classification requires cataloging under three
subheadings:
1) Rights against the state versus rights from the state;
2) State forbearance versus state action;
3) Rights which require versus rights which do not require finan-
cial contributions from fellow members of the state.
The American ideal, as expressed in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, is that all men "are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights" 9 and "[t]hat to secure these rights, Govern-
ments are instituted among Men."2 Thus the rights of Ameri-
cans-and other first generational rights-are generally classified
as rights against the state, demanding state forbearance, and re-
quiring no financial contributions from fellow Americans.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. United States Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland declared in a 1921 speech:
"To give a man his life but deny him his liberty, is to take from him all that makes his life
worth living. To give him his liberty but take from him the property which is the fruit and
badge of his liberty, is to still leave him a slave." W. SKOUSEN, Property Rights-Essential
to Liberty, THE CONSTITUTION 23-24 (1987).
It was also the view of John Locke, whose writings so influenced America's founding fa-
thers, that the right to property was the fundamental human right.
18. LA CONSTITUTION title I, § 3 (1791) (France).
19. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
20. Id.
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The First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides the perfect example:
Congress shall make no law [rights against the state requiring for-
bearance] respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances [and thus at no cost
to the citizenry]. 2
This can also be said about the other amendments making up the
United States Bill of Rights-almost. For example, the right to a
"speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,"22 as provided in
the sixth amendment, demands that the state create a criminal
justice system and that the population is taxed to support that
system.
This American ideal is, of course, contrary to the rights philoso-
phy expressed by the communist states. Article 39 of the 1977
Constitution of the Soviet Union begins its human rights chapter
this way: "Citizens of the USSR enjoy in full the social, economic,
political and personal rights and freedoms proclaimed and guaran-
teed by the Constitution of the USSR and by Soviet laws. The so-
cialist system ensures enlargement of the rights and freedoms of
citizens. ,,2 Article 50' of the Soviet Union's Constitution
states:
In accordance with the interests of the people and in order to
strengthen and develop the socialist system, citizens of the USSR
are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of assemble,
meetings, street processions and demonstrations. Exercise of these
political freedoms is ensured by putting public buildings, streets and
squares at the disposal of the working people and their organiza-
tions, by broad dissemination of information, and by the opportu-
nity to use the press, television, and radio."24
Soviet style freedoms of speech and press, thus fall into the cate-
gory of rights granted by the state, demanding state action and
requiring subsidization by other elements of the population,
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22. Id. amend VI.
23. KONSTITUTSIYA SSSR art. 29 (U.S.S.R.).
24. Id. at art. 50.
[Vol. 25:411
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whether or not they engaged in such activities.
Soviet thinking is an anachronism-at least according to United
Nations formulations. Article 19 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, conforming to inaction, forbearance and
the absence of subsidization states: "Everyone shall have the right
to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.
25
Even if the Soviet approach is an anachronism, this does not
mean that all constitutional pronouncements on freedom of speech
necessarily combine inaction, forbearance and the absence of sub-
sidization. This is especially true in the Third World. The most
important manifestation of freedom of speech today is the telecast.
Where a nation has only one television station and the station is
government owned, there can be no freedom of speech withot
government action and tax monies being allocated to keep the tele-
vision station in operation.26
It is subject matter which provides the real distinctions. Cer-
tainly, there is a human right to education. But such a right means
that the state must act to build schools and hire teachers, and that
in turn means that members of the public must pay taxes to com-
pensate the construction workers and the teachers to make this
possible. Such a duty is placed upon the state and the taxpayer
even though the government might prefer to spend its resources on
more military equipment and even though the taxpayer might de-
25. International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, art. 19 (1966) (entered into force,
March 23, 1976).
26. As draftsman of the 1984 Constitution of Liberia, I incorporated these words into
Article 15 dealing with freedom of expression: "Access to state owned media shall not be
denied because of any disagreement with or dislike of the ideas expressed. Denial of such
access may be challenged in a court of competent jurisdiction." CONSTITUTION OF THE FED-
ERAL REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, art. 15. I strengthened this point in my role as draftsman of the
Fiji Constitution of 1990:
Access to state owned media shall be granted to all legitimate, registered political
parties during a reasonable period and for a reasonable time prior to all elections.
Denial of access may be directed to the Supervisor of Elections for administrative
correction and, if necessary, appealed to the Constitutional Court which is empow-
ered to grant appropriate relief, including a mandamus order requiring television
time.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF FIJi (Blaustein draft, March 7, 1990). Regrettably, this
provision was not included in the final draft. Despite these exceptions, free speech and the
other American rights are rights against the state, calling for state forbearance and demand-
ing no subsidization.
1991]
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sire to send his children to private schools or has no children in the
schools at all. The same kind of analysis can also be employed in
contrasting the American rights with the right to health care, the
right to a fair wage, the right to social security, and the right to
protection of the family unit, which require state action and state
revenues.
C. Technical Distinctions
Bills of rights and their enumerated individual human rights can
also be classified on the basis of the following distinctions:
1) Rights complete within the constitutional text versus incom-
plete formulation requiring further legislation;
2) Rights which are self-executing versus rights requiring
implementation;
3) Rights which are operational versus rights which are
programmatic;
4) Rights which are immediate versus rights which are
programmatic;
5) Rights which are absolute versus rights which are qualified.
Constitutional provisions taken from various bills of rights illus-
trate one or more of these overlapping and often inconsistent
distinctions.
The human rights provisions of the United States Constitution,
including the Bill of Rights,27 the "privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus"2 and the limitation that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed, '29 can be classified as complete within
the text, self-executing, operational, immediate and absolute. At
least that is the way they appear when contrasted with the human
rights provisions in other constitutions. Yet the habeas corpus
clause includes the qualification that it may not "be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.''3° Nor have the words "no law" in the first amend-
ment been applied literally; the law reports are replete with deci-
sions limiting the right to both freedom of speech and freedom of
religion.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
28. Id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
29. Id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 2 and 3.
30. Id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
[Vol. 25:411
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But the essential distinction is still there. By contrast, examine
some of the human rights clauses of the 1978 Spanish Constitu-
tion. Incomplete and progressive: Education: "Teachers, parents,
and in some cases, the students, shall participate in the control
and management of all centers maintained by the Administration
with public funds, under the terms established by law. The public
authorities shall inspect and standardize the educational system so
as to guarantee compliance with the laws." 31 Non-self-executing
and programmatic: Economy: "The law shall establish the forms
of participation of those interested in Social Security and in the
activities of the public agencies whose function directly affects the
quality of life or general welfare."32 Qualified: Religion: "Freedom
of ideology, religion and cult of individuals and communities is
guaranteed without any limitation in their demonstrations other
than that which is necessary for the maintenance of public order
protected by law." 33
For good examples of the incomplete, progressive, programmatic,
qualified, and requiring implementation, consider the follow-
ing-promulgated on three separate continents, in countries with
very different cultures. From the Mexican Constitution of 1917: "It
is the duty of parents to preserve the right of minors to satisfy
their needs as to physical and mental health. The law shall deter-
mine the support for the protection of minors to be given by public
institutions. 3 4 In addition:
Every person is entitled to suitable work that is socially useful. To-
ward this end, the creation of jobs and social organization for labor
shall be promoted in conformance with the law. The Congress of the
Union, . .. shall enact labor laws which shall apply to: ...
[w]orkers, day laborers, domestic servants, artisans, and in a general
way to all labor contracts.3 5
From the 1989 amended Constitution of Algeria: "The institu-
tions seek to assure the equality of rights and duties of all citizens
in suppressing the obstacles, which obstruct the development of
the human personality and impede the effective participation of all
31. CONSTITUTION ESPANOLA art. 27, cl. 7 and 8 (Spain).
32. Id. at art. 129, cl. 1.
33. Id. at art. 16, cl. 1.
34. CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANos art. 4. (Mexico).
35. Id. at art. 123.
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in the political, economic, social and cultural life. '3 6 And: "All citi-
zens have the right to work. The right to protection, security and
hygiene at work is [to be] guaranteed by law. The right to rest is
[to be] guaranteed. The law [is to] determine the modalities of its
exercise. ' ' s3
Finally, provisions from the 1983 Constitution of the Nether-
lands, as amended in 1989: "It shall be the concern of the authori-
ties to keep the country habitable and to protect and improve the
environment."3 " Further: "(1) The authorities shall take steps to
promote the health of the population. (2) It shall be the concern of
the authorities to provide sufficient living accommodation. (3) The
.authorities shall promote social and cultural development and lei-
sure activities. 3
9
Ethiopia's Constitution of 1987 even identifies its education
clause as "progressive," noting: "The state shall progressively en-
sure compulsory education for school-age children and expand
schools and vocational institutions of various types and levels."'40
At the other extreme is the freedom of expression provision of the
Zimbabwe Constitution of 1979."1
36. ALGERIA CONST. art. 30.
37. Id. at art. 52.
38. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS art. 21.
39. Id. at art. 22.
40. ETHIOPIA CONST. art. 40, cl. 2.
41. CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE art. 2, cI. 20 states:
Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be
hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference,
and freedom from interference with his correspondence.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be
in contravention of subsection (1) to the extent that the law in question makes provi-
sion- (a) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, the economic interests
of the State, public morality or public health; (b) for the purlose of- (i) protecting
the reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons or the private lives of persons
concerned in legal proceedings; (ii) preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence; (iii) maintaining the authority and independence of the courts or tribu-
nals or the Senate or the House of Assembly; (iv) regulating the technical administra-
tion, technical operation or general efficiency of telephony, telegraphy, posts, wireless
broadcasting or television or creating or regulating any monopoly in these fields; (v)
in the case of correspondence, preventing the unlawful dispatch therewith of other
matter; or (c) that imposes restrictions upon public officers, except so far as that
provision or, as the case may be, the thing done under the authority thereof is shown
not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
(3) No religious denomination and no person or group of persons shall be prevented
from establishing and maintaining schools, whether or not that denomination, person
or group in receipt of any subsidy, grant or other form of financial assistance from the
9 "RIGHTS" AND BILLS OF RIGHTS
These classification exercises are useful in understanding the
scope of human rights, the varied approaches to human rights and
the language in which human rights are expressed. But this is 'not
enough. What is lacking-and needed-is a classification which
will dictate constitutional formulations of the different human
rights and govern, or at least guide, enforcement procedures.
IV. JUSTICIABILITY
Human rights can best be-and should be-classified according
to their justiciability. Distinctions must be drawn between those
rights which are judicially enforceable and those which are not.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Four Freedoms42 provided the
world with two of each: justiciable freedom of speech and freedom
of religion and non-justiciable freedom from want and freedom
from fear. The human rights classified in this manner should be
placed in different chapters of all constitutions. Further, all consti-
tutions should contain specific language as to the enforceability or
non-enforceability of these rights.
The division between the enumeration of human rights in the
United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and the enumeration in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is largely grounded on the justiciability distinction.
The reasoning behind the division, as Roger S. Clark has ex-
plained, is that the supervisory mechanisms and complaint proce-
dures applicable to civil and political rights would not be appropri-
ate for economic and social rights.43 While the principle is valid,
State.
(4) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be
in contravention of subsection (3) to the extent that the law in question makes provi-
sion- (a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public
health or town and country planning; or (b) for regulating such schools in the inter-
ests of persons receiving instruction therein; except so far as that provision or, as the
case may be, the thing done under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasona-
bly justifiable in a democratic society.
(5) No person shall be prevented from sending to any school a child of whom that
person is parent or guardian by reason only that the school is not a school established
or maintained by the State.
(6) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not be held to confer on any person a
right to exercise his freedom of expression in or on any road, street, lane, path, pave-
ment, side-walk, thoroughfare or similar place which exists for the free passage of
persons or vehicles.
42. F.D. ROOSEVELT, STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, 87 CONG. REc. 44, 46 (1941).
43. Clark, supra note 9, at 336.
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there are economic and social rights set forth in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Further, certain provisions
of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights are in fact justiciable, while certain rights listed in the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are not.
To give a few illustrations: Article 3 of the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights is designed "to en-
sure the equal rights of men and women" in the enjoyment of such
rights. Article 13(2)(b) provides that "[h]igher education shall be
made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity." Certainly,
these are justiciable. On the other hand, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights provides in Article 22 for the
economic "right to form and join trade unions." Article 23 states
that "the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of soci-
ety and is entitled to protection by society and the State." Article
27 sets forth group rights to culture, religion and language. These
are topically more appropriate to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and certainly the last two
are not justiciable.
Nor does the four generation classification system of human
rights divide in accordance with justiciability. Most political rights
are justiciable and most economic rights are not. Most of the third
generation of human rights are likewise non-justiciable. Yet prop-
erty rights and the right to enter into contract are both economic
and justiciable, and environmental rights and most group rights
can also be judicially determined.
Again, what is proposed for all future constitutions are separate
chapters for justiciable and non-justiciable rights, with appropriate
explanations to the effect that the justiciable human rights are en-
forceable by the judiciary and a statement that the non-justiciable
rights are directives and guidelines addressed to the legislative and
executive branches.
Regrettably, this proposition has yet to be accepted by the draft-
ers at work on the new constitutions of Eastern Europe and Latin
America. Polish, Romanian, Russian and Yugoslavian (both Slove-
nian and Croatian) constitutionalists endlessly look to and for Eu-
ropean and American approaches and hesitate to adopt ideas
which deviate from these constitutional backgrounds." The same
44. 1 have been consulting with these constitutionalists.
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can be said for the constitutionalists of Brazil and Peru.45 Persuad-
ing the new drafters to deviate from the European and American
approaches is the principal reason for writing this article.
V. THE JUSTICIABILITY PRECEDENT
The earliest constitutional precedent for the division between
justiciable and non-justiciable human rights is European. It is a
feature of the 1937 Constitution of Ireland. Articles 40 to 44 are in
the chapter headed "Fundamental Rights." Included in this chap-
ter are provisions on liberty, equality, freedom of speech, and
property. Another chapter bears the heading, "Directive Principles
of Social Policy." Article 45 is the sole provision under this chapter
and includes the "right to an adequate means of livelihood" and a
pledge to "safeguard with especial care the economic interests of
the weaker sections of the community. ' 46 The first paragraph of
article 45 is instructive:
The principles of social policy set forth in this Article are intended
for the general guidance of the Oireachtas [Parliament]. The appli-
cation of those Principles in the making of law shall be the care of
the Oireachtas exclusively, and shall not be cognisable by any Court
under any of the provisions of this Constitution.47
While the Irish example remained largely unknown and unher-
alded in constitutional circles, it became important in 1949 when
India followed this precedent for its Independence Constitution.
The chapter designated as Part III is entitled "Fundamental
Rights." This includes the justiciable rights. The chapter labeled
Part IV is entitled "Directive Principles of State Policy." This in-
cludes the non-justiciable rights, the guidelines for the executive
and legislature. The sole caveat as to the division of justiciable and
non-justiciable rights is found in Article 37 of Part IV: "The provi-
sions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court,
but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental
in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the
State to apply these principles in making laws.' 48
45. I was unable to convince these constitutionalists to deviate from the European and
American approaches.
46. IRELAND CONST. art. 45.
47. Id.
48. INDIA CONST. art. 37.
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The approach used by India was copied in the framing of the
Bangladesh Constitution of 1972, with Part II designated as "Fun-
damental Principles of State Policy" and Part III entitled "Funda-
mental Rights." There was, however, no explanation of the division
or provisions on enforcement.49 The 1989 Constitution of the Fed-
eral Republic of Nigeria, scheduled to go into effect in 1992, also
follows this approach, and does it better. Chapter II is labelled
"Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy"
and Chapter IV is entitled "Fundamental Rights." Chapter III on
"Citizenship" is between the two chapters. The division is well
planned. Chapter II subheadings are characterized by objectives:
political objectives, economic objectives, social objectives, educa-
tional objectives, and foreign policy objectives, with additional top-
ics included such as the "Directive on Nigerian culture." The
"Fundamental Rights" chapter includes the right to life, the right
to dignity, the right to liberty, the right to a fair hearing, the right
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to free-
dom of expression and the press, the right to freedom of move-
ment, and the right to freedom from discrimination. This chapter
ends with a lengthy section on enforcement procedures to preserve
such rights.50
49. I had the privilege of working on this constitution with the principal drafter, Kamal
Hossain, then designated as Minister of Law, and with the late Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, the
first president of Bangladesh. Unfortunately, neither could be convinced of the need for
such explanation or for enforcement specifications.
50. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (Draft) § 44 states:
(1) Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is
being or is likely to be contravened in any State or in the Federal Capital Territory,
Abuja, in relation to him may apply to a High Court having jurisdiction in that area
for redress.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original
jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the
provisions of this section and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such
directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the
enforcement within that State or in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, of any
rights to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this
Chapter.
(3) The Chief Justice of Nigeria may make rules with respect to the practice and
procedure of a High Court for the purposes of this section.
(4) The National Assembly-
(a) may confer upon a High Court such powers in addition to those conferred by
this section as may appear to the National Assembly to be necessary or desirable
for the purpose of enabling the court more effectively to exercise the jurisdiction
conferred upon it by this section; and
(b) shall make provisions-
(i) for the rendering of financial assistance to any indigent citizen of Nigeria
where his right under this Chapter has been infringed or with a view to enabling
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This article recommends the bill of rights format which was de-
veloped for the 1984 Constitution of Liberia, and further refined
for the 1990 Constitution of Fiji.51 Chapter II of the Fijian Consti-
tution, labelled "Principles of National Policy," deals with cultural
preservation, promotion of family unity, and safeguards for mater-
nity, infancy and youth. It also includes provisions such as Article
11: "The Republic shall take all necessary and proper steps to pro-
tect the safety, health and welfare of all of its citizens and of aliens
legally residing within its borders." 52 Chapter III, "Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms," lists the justiciable rights: rights to life, lib-
erty and property, the requirement of equality, freedom of religion,
freedom of political expression, and freedom of movement. There
is nothing new about such delineation. What is new are the consti-
tutional explanations and provisions on enforcement.
Article 6, entitled "Principles of National Policy," introduces
Chapter II. Article 6 states:
The principles set forth in this Chapter, except as otherwise pro-
vided for in this Constitution, are not justiciable and thus shall not
be enforceable by any court. They shall nonetheless be fundamental
in the governance of the Republic of Fiji and shall serve as guide-
lines in governmental policy-making and in the formulation of exec-
utive, legislative and administrative enactments and directives.5 3
him to engage the services of a legal practitioner to prosecute his claim, and en-
sure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied, and
(ii) for ensuring that allegations of infringement of such rights are substantial
and the requirement or need for financial or legal aid is real.
(5) In this section, reference to a High Court includes a reference to the Federal
High in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
51. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, chapter II, (General Principles of National.
Policy), art. 4 has the following introduction: "The principles contained in this Chapter,
except as otherwise provided for in this Constitution, shall not be enforceable by any court,
but shall nevertheless be fundamental in the governance of the Republic and shall serve as
guidelines in the formation of legislative, executive and administrative directives and poli-
cymaking and their execution."
Chapter III, (Fundamental Rights), art. 26, has the following introduction: "Where any
person or association alleges that any of the rights granted under this Constitution or any
legislation or directives are constitutionally contravened, that person or association may in-
voke the privilege and benefit of court direction or order or writ, including a judgment of
unconstitutionality."
I developed the format as framer of the 1984 Constitution of Liberia and further refined it
as counsel and draftsman for the 1990 Constitution of Fiji.
52. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF Fiji art. 11 (Blaustein draft, Mar. 7, 1990).
53. Id. art. 6.
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In contrast, Article 14, entitled "Fundamental Rights and Free-
doms," explains Chapter III. Article 14 states:
All of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Chapter are justicia-
ble; and every person and association that contends that any of
them shall have been contravened, whether or not claimant is ag-
grieved, may invoke the privilege and benefit of appropriate court
order, writ or ruling, including a judgment of unconstitutionality.54
This statement of justiciability is further strengthened by Article
56 in the judiciary chapter, establishing a constitutional court with
jurisdiction to hear human rights issues. This provision gives se-
lected government officials, Fijian religious and ethnic groups,
human rights organizations, and other non-governmental organiza-
tions alleging human rights violations the right to bring their com-
plaints directly to the constitutional court.55
Unfortunately, the Fijian Cabinet changed this enforcement pro-
vision in Section 19 of the final draft of the 1990 Constitution. 6 It
54. Id. at art. 14.
55. Id. at art. 56 states:
(a) The Constitutional Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine
all constitutional issues brought by any individual who alleges that any provision in
this Constitution has been or is likely to be contravened and that his interests are
being or are likely to be affected by such contravention, or, in the case of a person
who is detained, by any person or group alleging such a contravention in relation to
him.
(b) The Constitutional Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine
all constitutional issues brought by (1) the President, the Prime Minister, the
Ombudsman, the Minister for Fijian Affairs, the Minister for Indian Affairs, the At-
torney-General, the Solicitor-General and the Director of Public Prosecutions, and
(2) Fijian political parties, religious groups, ethnic groups, human rights organiza-
tions, environmental protection organizations and any other Fijian groups alleging
human rights violations.
(c) The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine consti-
tutional issues on its own motion, with power to appoint solicitors or barristers to
argue such issues before it. The Court shall also be empowered, in open court, to
grant advisory opinions in response to constitutional questions referred to it by the
President.
(d) The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine consti-
tutional issues referred to it by the High Court and to hear or deny appeals on consti-
tutional issues from final decisions of the High Court.
(e) The Constitutional Court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction and powers if
it adjudges that the constitutional issues raised are without merit or is satisfied that
adequate means of redress are available for the person or persons concerned in pro-
ceedings before the High Court.
56. Id. at art. 19, cl. 1 states:
If any person alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being, or
is likely to be contravened in relation to him (or, in the case of a person who is
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now limits the initiation of human rights charges and claims for
redress to persons alleging that their own human rights had been
contravened or "in the case of a person who is detained, if any
other person alleges such a contravention in relation to the de-
tained person. '5 7
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONS OF TOMORROW
The last decade of the twentieth century will go down in history
as the decade of constitutionalism. Never before have there been in
operation so many constituent assemblies and constitutional com-
missions, as well as committees, councils, caucuses and conventions
(both governmental and non-governmental) employed in constitu-
tional planning. And there are more to come. While American at-
tention today is primarily focused on constitutional change in the
eastern European countries so recently freed from communism,
such developments merely scratch the surface. Far more important
is the new constitution being framed for the reunited Germany and
the new constitution for the Soviet Union. Then there are constitu-
tions recently promulgated and planned for the fifteen republics of
the Soviet Union and the six republics of Yugoslavia. There is also
constitutional planning in Belgium, whose 1831 constitution is the
third oldest in continuous existence, behind the United States
Constitution, ratified in 1788, and the Norway Constitution, rati-
fied in 1814.
In this hemisphere, there is constitutional debate in Canada, and
activity in Grenada and Panama, plus a planned meeting on the
revision of the undemocratic Sandinista Constitution of Nicaragua.
As a result of the 1990 election, a commission has now been estab-
lished to begin planning a new constitution for Colombia, whose
1886 charter is the world's seventh oldest in continuous existence.
Efforts have been renewed to reestablish the aborted attempt to
revise the 1853 Constitution of Argentina, the fourth oldest in con-
tinuous existence. Constitutional changes in Chile and Peru are
imminent and there are constitutional blueprints being devised for
Surinam.
detained, if any other person alleges such a contravention in relation to the detained
person), then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter
which is lawfully available, that person (or that other person) may apply to the High
Court for redress.
57. Id. at art. 19.
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Soon to be high on the constitutional agenda is a new charter for
Iraq, and the constitutional changes in all of the Persian Gulf
states which will certainly follow from the events of the war in the
Persian Gulf. Then there must be a new constitution for Afghani-
stan. Israel, one of the three countries in the world which does not
have a single-document constitution (the United Kingdom and
New Zealand are the other two) is in the midst of constitutional
discussions. On the other side of the Asian continent, the decade
should see a unification constitution for the two Koreas, a revised
constitution for the hastily-drawn 1987 Philippine Constitution,
and new constitutions for Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.
Africa will have the largest number of new constitutions. Of
great international importance is a new constitution for South Af-
rica, for which there have been more proposals, more discussions
and more conflict than with any constitution in history. Ghana ex-
pects to have a new constitution this year and so does Guinea.
Work is also being undertaken on new constitutions for Angola,
Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Madagascar, Mozambique, Somalia and
Sudan.
In the Pacific, New Zealand issued its first human rights charter
in 1990 and there are discussions underway, as in Israel, for a one-
document constitution. New Caledonia's forthcoming indepen-
dence will also result in a new constitution.
Each constitution will have a bill of rights or, more properly, a
chapter or chapters on human rights. Each will be more influenced
by the German Basic Law of 1949 than the United States Consti-
tution. This is because the "official" introduction to the German
document which is distributed throughout the world speaks of one
of its foundations as the "social-state" principle: "The social-state
principle was established mainly to protect the weaker members of
society. The state is required to ensure that every member of the
community is free from want, can live in circumstances worthy of
human dignity, and has a fair share of the nations's general pros-
perity. ' 58 But Chapter I of Germany's constitution, entitled "Basic
Rights," lists all of the human rights, both justiciable and non-jus-
ticiable. This pattern should not be followed. Furthermore, Ger-
many's constitution does not furnish a strong enough provision on
58. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Public Document, Introduction
(which is not part of the Basic Law), Federal Republic of Germany (1987).
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human rights enforcement. 59
It is proposed that the constitution for the new, united Ger-
many, as well as all of the other new constitutions to come, adopt
the two-chapter formula-European (Irish) in origin, developed in
Asia by the world's largest democracy (India), copied by the big-
gest and most important nation in Africa (Nigeria), followed in the
American-style Constitution of Liberia, and developed (though fi-
nally not adopted) for the Pacific nation of Fiji.
Disregarding the generational and technical classifications be-
tween and among the various listings of human rights, these con-
stitutions should distinguish between the justiciable and non-justi-
ciable human rights. Such rights should be set forth in two distinct
chapters with adequate explanations for the division, together with
a clear statement as to which are subject to judicial enforcement
and which are directives or guidelines for the other branches of
government. And, the framers should dictate strong and detailed
procedures for the enforcement of those rights which are in the
province of the courts.
59. GERMAN CONST. art. 19(4) states: "Should any person's right be violated by public
authority, recourse to the court shall be open to him. If jurisdiction is not specified, recourse
shall be to the ordinary courts ....
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